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RESUMEN: Este trabajo analiza el comportamiento de los partidos políticos en la arena parlamentaria, llevando 
a cabo un análisis de la votación final de las leyes y de las enmiendas presentadas por los grupos parlamentarios 
en el Parlamento español. Los resultados ilustran que los factores institucionales, como el tipo de gobierno y las 
asimetrías en la información y recursos de los grupos, influencian de manera significativa las estrategias de 
oposición y la dinámica de consenso parlamentario. El conflicto es siempre más elevado durante los gobiernos 
de mayoría absoluta, independientemente de la estrategia de oposición que se considere. La actividad de los 
grupos de tamaño más reducido, y en especial de aquellos sin experiencia parlamentaria previa, rara vez se 
centran en iniciativas de oposición asociadas con una elevada fricción institucional, como la presentación de 
enmiendas con texto alternativo. Su agenda está mucho más concentrada, con la atención centrada en menos 
asuntos que los grandes grupos. 
 
 




RESUM: Aquest treball analitza el comportament dels partits polítics en l'àmbit parlamentari, portant a terme 
una anàlisi de la votació final de les lleis i de les esmenes presentades pels grups parlamentaris al Parlament 
espanyol. Els resultats il·lustren que els factors institucionals, com el tipus de govern i les asimetries en la 
informació i recursos dels grups, influencien de manera significativa les estratègies d'oposició i la dinàmica de 
consens parlamentari. El conflicte és sempre més elevat durant els governs de majoria absoluta,  
independentment de l'estratègia d'oposició que es consideri. L'activitat dels grups de mida més reduïda, i 
especialment d'aquells sense experiència parlamentària prèvia, poques vegades se centren en iniciatives 
d'oposició associades amb una elevada fricció institucional, com la presentació d'esmenes amb text alternatiu. La 
seva agenda està molt més concentrada, amb l'atenció centrada en menys assumptes que els grups grans. 





ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes party behavior in the parliamentary arena by undertaking an analysis of the 
final vote for legislation and the amending activity of parliamentary groups in the Spanish parliament. Results 
illustrate that institutional factors, like the type of government and asymmetries in the resources and information 
of groups, significantly affect opposition strategies and patterns of parliamentary consensus. Conflict is always 
higher during absolute majority governments, regardless of the opposition strategy considered. The activity of 
small groups, and especially those without previous parliamentary experience, is rarely focused on opposition 
initiatives associated with high institutional friction, like amendments with alternative text proposal. Its agenda  
is much more concentrated, with attention focused on few topics, than that of big groups. 
 









Even though parliamentary opposition is a fundamental feature of democracy, most contemporary political 
systems are characterized by strong pattern of executive predominance. In the case of Spain, the executive has 
always included one of the two main parties, the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) and the PP (Partido 
Popular), and has governed forming single party cabinets supported by relative or absolute majority. The 
superiority of the executive and the governing party in Spain resulted, for a long time, on a quite stable 
parliamentary dynamic based on strong opposition support for the executives’ legislation and on the use of 
ordinary procedures to pass legislation (Capo, 1994, Mújica and Sánchez Cuenca, 2006, Ajengo and Molina 
2011). However, Spain has experienced in the last decade a significant transformation in the policy style of 
governing (Chaqués-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartner 2015). The use of decree-laws has increased significantly 
over time, especially since the outbreak of the economic crisis and the arrival into power of the conservatives in 
2011, which are governing with absolute majority of seats. This hierarchical and unilateral style of policy 
making has been accompanied by increasing opposition in the parliamentary arena (Palau, Muñoz and Chaqués- 
Bonafont 2015). The mean percentage of negative vote for legislation during the legislature of Rajoy reaches 
25%, when during the previous socialist and conservative government, from 2001 to 2011, never surpassed 10%. 
The consensus sought and obtained on important pieces of legislation during years in the Spanish Parliament 
seems now to be gone. 
The goal of this paper is to contribute to the on-going discussion about what factors explain variations in the 
patterns of parliamentary consensus over time. Rational choice approaches and game theory have emphasized 
individual actors and their preferences, especially to explain voting behavior in the US Congress. The role of 
ideological divide on specific issues and institutional factors, like control of the legislative agenda and variations 
in the type of government, have also been considered as explanatory variables in the literature (e.g. Christiansen 
and Damgaard, 2008, Gallagher et al 1992, Norton, 2008, Helms 2008, Strom, 2008). Recent research has 
explored also to what extent contextual factors, like variations in the popularity of the government, affect party 
behavior in the parliamentary arena (e.g. De Giorgi and Moury 2015, Palau, Muñoz and Chaqués 2015). Our 
goal is to analyze government opposition dynamics following this research by considering the output sphere, 
namely the final vote for legislation, but also the input sphere. 
Party behavior has been subjected to important empirical investigation but we know less about the amending 
activity of opposition groups, especially regarding Western European parliaments. Social choice theorists and 
legislative scholars have studied how legislative outcomes can be manipulated using strategic amendments (e.g. 
Wilkerson 1999). However, most of this literature refers to the well researched U.S. House of Representatives. 
For Western European parliaments, from the University of Potsdam-based comparative project on parliaments 
(Döring 1995), we have extensive knowledge on the rules and procedures that govern the pass of legislation in 
the chamber in different European countries. We also know rather well the impact of individual members’ right 
of initiating and amending legislation on the legislative output (see Mattson 1995). Existing literature explains 
why and under what circumstances amendments survive through the legislative process, but we know little about 







legislation, ask for better accuracy or technical improvements, but certain types of amendments, like return 
amendments, represent a clear opposition to the executive’s initiatives. 
Our goal in this paper is to provide a comprehensive explanation of party behavior in the parliamentary arena by 
considering the final vote for legislation and the amending activity of opposition groups. We want to know what 
explains variations in the patterns of parliamentary consensus over time but also why parliamentary groups use 
different types of opposition initiatives. Do institutional factors like asymmetries in the size and resources of 
groups affect their opposition strategies? Can the combination of both institutional and contextual factors explain 
also variations in the amending activity of opposition groups? To answer these questions we rely on two 
comprehensive database containing information about the final vote for legislation and the amendments 
introduced by opposition groups to legislation in the initiation phase, namely before bills are examined in 
legislative committees, from 2001 to 2014. These databases were created by the Spanish Policy Agendas Project 
(www.ub.edu/spanihpolicyagendas). 
The paper is organized as following. First, we develop our theoretical framework and hypotheses. Next we 
explain the data and methodology used for the analysis. Then we briefly describe the evolution of voting and 
amending activity of opposition groups in the Spanish parliament. We conclude by testing our hypothesis and 
summarizing the main conclusions of the analysis. 
 
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Opposition groups have a menu of options to oppose the legislative initiatives introduced by the executive in the 
Chamber. Depending on the type of initiative, they can cast a negative vote for legislation or introduce return 
amendments, amendments with alternative text proposals or alternative bills to those introduced by the 
incumbent. However, individuals and also groups have limited resources and capacity to process information  
and to be involved simultaneously in different activities (Simon 1947, Hall 1993, Talbert and Potoski 2002, 
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, Jones and Baumgartner 2005). As an extensive literature has already illustrate, 
there are intrinsic limits on the capacity of the agenda of opposition groups, so they must decide where to invest 
their limited attention and resources. Therefore, the decision about what is the best opposition strategy will 
depend on the institutional friction (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) associated to different type of parliamentary 
initiatives, namely on the costs imposed by the particular rules and procedures that regulate these initiatives. 
Departing from the analysis of parliamentary rules, Table 1 illustrates the institutional friction associated with 
different types of parliamentary opposition in Spain. On the output sphere, a final vote on legislation only exists 
in Spain for decree laws and organic laws. Voting is associated with very low friction because parliamentary 
groups do not need to argue why they oppose legislation neither has to present an alternative proposal to the 
regulation introduced by the executive. On the input sphere, on the contrary, opposition initiatives are much 
more subjected to friction. In the case of amendments, the level of friction depends on the type of amendment, 
ranking from very low to high institutional constraints. Once the Bureau of the Congress publishes an executive 
bill, it sets a date for the opening of the period during which amendments can be proposed. Parliamentary groups 







fifteen days to propose amendments that can be of different kindi. Amendments can be related to the whole text 
of the bill (enmiendas a la totalidad) or to certain sections (enmiendas al articulado). Amendments to the whole 
text can be of two types: 1) return amendments (de devolución): these are amendments calling for the return of 
the bill to the executive, questioning the opportunity or the main principles of the bill; 2) amendments with 
alternative text proposals (con texto alternativo): these propose a complete alternative text to the bill introduced 
by the executive and can be submitted only by parliamentary groups. Amendments to the whole text are 
discussed and voted in the chamber’ plenary. 
Overall, the analysis of the institutional costs associated with different opposition strategies illustrates that, for  
an opposition group, it is costly to work on the input than on the output sphere. For introducing an amendment 
with alternative text proposal, it is necessary to have worked on a text and having a clear idea about how to 
regulate an issue, which requires time, expertise and resources. Big groups, having more parliamentary seats, 
have more resources than small groups that may find negative voting and return amendments the least 
burdensome way to oppose executive initiatives, given their size and hence limited capacity for legislative 
initiative (Di Palma 1977). The group’s size matter but also does their previous parliamentary experience. Those 
parties which have obtained parliamentary representation during more legislatures are more likely to have 
knowledge on parliamentary procedures, having a comparative advantage in relation to newcomers. They have 
had also more time to develop alternative proposals on their preferred issues, and on those they know are likely 
to be regulated by the incumbent. Similarly, parliamentary groups composed of two or more parties, especially  
if they are ideologically related, are likely to have more resources at their disposal than small single-party 
groups. Overall, because resources are asymmetrically distributed among parliamentary groups, we expect that: 
H1: small parliamentary groups, and especially those without previous parliamentary experience, will focus 
their opposition strategies on initiatives associated with low institutional friction. 
 
 
Limitations in agenda capacity affect the type of opposition strategy used by parliamentary groups but also the 
issue content of the initiatives. Because groups have limited resources, they are likely to focus on those where 
they have a competitive advantage (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996; Vavreck, 2009, Meyer and Wagner 
2013). According to the issue competition perspective, parties differ in the emphasis they place on the various 
topics on the political agenda, focusing on those that can provide them more electoral rewards. This perspective, 
developed to explain electoral competition, should also hold true in the parliamentary arena, so that we should 
find important differences in the issues emphasized by different parties in their opposition strategies. Because  
big groups have more resources than small or challenger groups, and because they are oriented to satisfy the 
preferences of a broad political spectrum of the electorate, they are more likely to have a fragmented agenda, 
focusing their opposition activities on a broader set of issues. Small groups by the contrary, with fewer resources 
and with a more defined electorate, especially regional parties, are more likely to have a “niche” profile,  
focusing their opposition activities on different and less number of issues (Meguid, 2005, 2008). Because 
limitations in agenda capacity, we expect these differences to be especially important regarding initiatives 







According to this we expect: H2: small groups will have a more concentrated opposition agenda than big 
groups, especially regarding those initiatives associated with high institutional friction 
 
 
Opposition strategies of parliamentary groups are affected by variations in agenda capacity, but an extensive 
literature has already illustrated that other institutional factors, like variations in the type of government, 
significantly affect patterns of parliamentary consensus (e.g. Duverger, 1951; Dahl, 1966; Sartori, 1966; 
Cazzola, 1974; Pasquino, 1995; Mújica and Sánchez Cuenca, 2006; Christiansen and Damgaard 2008, Hix et al. 
2014, Palau, Muñoz and Chaqués 2015). Governments have higher incentives to seek agreement with opposition 
parties when they do not hold a majority of seats. The need for trade-offs makes parliamentary consensus more 
likely and also reduces the likelihood of introducing return amendments for legislation. For the period analyzed 
here, minority governments existed during the Zapatero’s socialist government, from 2004 to 2011. During the 
first legislature (2004-2008), the PSOE headed a minority government with the support of the far left (Izquierda 
Unida (IU), and its catalan branch (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV)) and Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (ERC), while after 2008 this formal, stable support was diluted into specific and punctual alliances 
with left and regional political parties. Absolute majority government by the contrary, increase the incentives of 
opposition groups for opposing legislation and introducing return amendments, as response to a more unilateral 
policy making style of government. Opposition initiatives acquire a special symbolic dimension under absolute 
majority governments. In Spain, the Partido Popular (PP) was governing with absolute majority of seats from 
2000 to 2004 (with José Maria Aznar as President of the Government) and from 2011 to present (under Mariano 
Rajoy). According to this we expect that: H3: during minority governments the mean percentage of negative  
vote for legislation decreases. More return amendments and amendments with alternative text proposals are 
introduced when the executive is governing with the absolute majority of seats. 
 
 
Because of increasing delegation of competences upwards, towards the EU, the impact of institutional factors 
cannot be circumscribed to the domestic arena. Europeanization has reinforced the superior position of the 
executive in the legislative process in many ways. First, opposition groups are unable to assert their policy 
preferences on EU issues. Governmental elites are those that intervene in the agenda setting and decision-making 
process at the EU level, and once a decision is taken at the European arena, renegotiation at the national level is 
costly and risky (Moravsick 1994). Second, because of the low politicization of European integration in Spain, 
the executive has high room for manoeuvre for negotiating with EU institutions, being subjected to low 
parliamentary scrutiny on the part of opposition parliamentary groups at domestic level (Chaqués, Palau and 
Baumgartner 2015). 
From previous research (Palau, Muñoz and Chaqués 2015), we know that the economic crisis has increased the 
incentives of opposition groups, especially those from the left, to oppose EU legislation. However, given the 
high party support for European integration in Spain, and because in countries without Euro-sceptic parties, 
opposition groups have high incentives to collaborate with the incumbent in relation to EU issues (Hooghe et al., 







content, groups will introduce less return amendments and amendments with alternative text proposals than on 
domestic legislation. Opposition groups may introduce amendments on EU related legislation, to highlight 
deficits in the implementation of EU Directives for example, but they are not likely to use more radical forms of 
opposition, like return amendments. According to this we expect: H4. Parliamentary groups will introduce less 




Institutional factors are important but purely institutional factors do not even get close to a proper understanding 
of opposition behavior in the parliamentary arena (Helms 2008). Decisions taken by opposition groups in the 
parliamentary arena depend also on strategic considerations and contextual factors (Ström 1997). Parties, as 
rational actors, try to maximize the likelihood of the outcomes they favor and re-election is an important 
component of their motivations. The prospect for reelection is important because, as Norton (2008:244) argues, 
smaller opposition parties, especially policy outliers not expecting to be in a future government, are more likely 
to adopt a critical role and engage in non-responsible forms of opposition than mainstream parties all across the 
legislature. 
Because parties care about reelection and future electoral results, the symbolic uses of opposition strategies may 
increase when elections approach. At the end of the term, parliamentary groups can engage in a more adversarial 
opposition in order to attract media attention, to please influential interests organizations, display results to the 
local party organization and or to show their voters and constituencies that they promote the electorate’s interests 
(Mattson :482). Van Schoor (1972) for example, demonstrates that an important number of bills do not contain 
more than two articles and they are introduced close to the parliament’s dissolution, with no chance of being 
examined as a result of electoral propaganda towards the legislators’ constituents and clientele groups. 
According to this, we expect that: H5: Regardless of the opposition initiative considered, parliamentary 
consensus decreases when elections approach 
 
 
III. DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 
To explore our hypotheses, we examine party behavior in the parliamentary arena by considering both the input 
and the output sphere. Our dependent variable includes different initiatives that we consider to be indicative of 
parliamentary opposition to executive’s legislative proposals: 1) negative vote for decree-laws and organic laws; 
and 2) amending activity on executive bills: return amendments and amendments with alternative text proposal. 
For the analysis of voting we created a dataset containing information about the final voting of all the organic 
lawsii and the validation votes for of all the decree-lawsiii passed by in the Spanish parliament between 2001 and 
2014. A total of 128 organic laws and 204 decree laws (332 pieces of legislation) have been coded and analyzed. 
The voting database contains information about the total number of votes and the specific particular votes cast  
by each parliamentary group (positive, negative, abstentions and absences). Data about the total number of votes 







parliamentary group is only available under request for the period 2001 to 2012. At present, the Congress 
webpage also includes information about particular parliamentary groups’ votes from 2013 to present. 
To analyze the input sphere we created a second database about the amending activity of all parliamentary 
groups in relation to 566 bills passed from 2001 to 2014. We have coded all the amendments introduced in the 
initiation phase of legislation, before bills enter the Committee phase, with the exception of the General Budget 
Laws, which follow a specific amendment procedure. For each bill we have gather information about the total 
number of amendments introduced by each parliamentary group, differentiating among return amendments, 
amendments with alternative text proposal and amendments to the section of the bill. In the last case, we also 
considered whether amendments were introduced to the bill’s memorandum, to the articles or to the final 
provisions. Because we are analyzing initiatives that manifest opposition to the executive’s legislative proposals, 
we only considered return amendments and amendments with alternative text proposals. Amendments to bill’s 
sections or articles may ask the government for the reformulation of a specific aspect of legislation, better 
accuracy or technical improvements but they are not indicator of parliamentary group’s opposition to the bill. 
The analysis of negative vote for legislation relies on the mean percentage of negative votes. Because the total 
number of return amendments (and also return amendments with alternative text proposal) cannot be compared 
across legislatures in absolute terms, we have calculated a return amendment rate (Rar) based on the following 
formula: 






where, for each legislature, Ra is the total number of return amendments (or return amendments with alternative 
text) introduced, B is the total number of bills passed and P the total number of parties that have the possibility, 
at least, of introducing one return amendment on each bill. 
Regarding the independent variables, to analyze variations in agenda capacity we consider 1) the number of 
parliamentary seats, 2) the number of parties that form the parliamentary group, and 3) the number of  
legislatures (since 1982) in which the party has parliamentary group. Differences across issues have been 
calculated considering the 19 macro topics defined by the Comparative Agendas Project methodology 
(www.comparativeagendas.info), according to which all our databases have been coded. The analysis of agenda 
concentration relies on the calculation of the Shannon entropy index. This index measures the distribution of 
attention across the 19 CAP issue categories providing an indicator of the relative concentration or dispersion of 
data (Baumgartner et al. 2000, Talbert and Potoski 2002, Boydstun et al. 2014). It ranges from 0 to the natural 
log of 19 (3). A score of 0 indicates that attention is concentrated in a single topic; by the contrary, a score of 3 
indicates that attention is perfectly distributed across issues. The higher the entropy, the less concentrated the 
agendaiv. 
To analyse the impact of minority-majority governments, the difference in the number of seats between the 
incumbent and the main opposition party is taken into account. To control for variations across the legislature we 







to the day the piece of legislation is voted/amended. The EU content of legislation was analyzed with a dummy 
variable with value 1 if the legislative piece was totally or partially defined by a binding regulatory act. 
 
 
IV. VOTING AND AMENDING ACTIVITY IN THE SPANISH PARLIAMENT 
 
The politics of consensus that characterized Spanish democracy during more than two decades has shifted 
towards increasing polarization and confrontation (Chaqué-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartner 2015). One of the 
factors leading this change in the policy style of governing is the increasing use of initiatives and policy 
instruments that neglect the role of opposition groups in the legislative process. During the last decade, the 
increasing use of decree-laws to take decisions, even on issues that have nothing to do with urgent necessities, 
and the use of non-ordinary procedures to pass legislation, have reinforced the already dominant position of the 
executive over the legislature in Spanish politics. As figure 1 illustrates, the percentage of bills passed using 
ordinary procedures has decreased from 45% during the second term of Aznar to 20% during the Rajoy’s. More 
than 50% of the laws passed from December 2011 to September 2014 are decree-laws, versus an average of 15% 
during the legislature of Aznar and 22% during Rodríguez Zapatero governments. Also, as Chaqués, Palau and 
Baumgartner (2015) illustrate, less than 9% of the decree-laws introduced by Rajoy are related to urgent needs 
like environmental catastrophes or unexpected events—earthquakes, droughts or fires. 
This variation in the policy style of governing has resulted in increasing confrontation in the Spanish Parliament, 
especially since 2011, when the PP began to govern with an absolute majority and important reform measures 
aimed at tackling the economic crisis were passed. Growing confrontation can be observed in both the output 
and the input sphere. As figure 2 illustrates, the mean percentage of negative votes for legislation has increased 
during the legislature of Rajoy up to 25%, being significantly higher than during the absolute majority of Aznar, 
when the mean percentage of negative votes for legislation did not surpass 10%. In the case of decree-laws 
negative voting during the legislature of Rajoy reaches 22% while during the legislatures of Aznar and Zapatero 
it was never higher than 10%. Regarding organic laws, the mean percentage of negative vote during the 
government of Aznar was 10% and reached 13% during the legislature of Zapatero, when controversial 
controversial policy reforms in areas such as education, immigration or the disputed reform to the Catalan 
Statute were passed. But during the Rajoy’s legislature, the mean negative vote for organic laws reaches 28%. 
This is related to the policies implemented to overcome the economic crisis, especially to those passed through 
decree laws, but also to other controversial policy decisions taken during this term, like reform of the education 
law, questioning the use of regional languages as vehicular languages at school; or the criminal justice and 
citizen’s security act, restraining civil liberties. Overall, the level of consensus has fallen dramatically after 2011, 
reaching during the legislature of Rajoy the lowest level of consensus since the transition to democracyv. 
In the input sphere, the rate of return amendments was already high during the legislature of Aznar, but it has 
further increased during the government of Rajoy. The introduction of amendments with alterative text proposals 
has increased during the Rajoy’s legislature compared to the Zapatero’s, but it is lower than during the first 
absolute majority of the conservatives, when Aznar was governing, especially regarding organic laws. These 







increased in the parliamentary arena in both the input and the output sphere, and that parliamentary groups have 
not devoted many resources to present alternative proposals to the policies implemented by the conservatives. 
The economic crisis has been characterized by an adversarial model of opposition, that is, opposition groups 
have adopted a distinct position from the party in office following a strategy based on conflict (Rose, 1980). 
Opposition groups mainly react to a new style of government characterized by unilateral decision-making, which 
has made difficult the participation of opposition parliamentary groups in important policy decisions. The 
Spanish parliament has not functioned as an operational governing body oriented to solving problems following 
cooperative strategies, as the consensual model would suggests (Scott and Wilkerson, 2012). Next we analyse to 




V. THE IMPACT OF AGENDA CAPACITY ON PARLIAMENTARY PARTY BEHAVIOUR 
 
One of our hypotheses is that the opposition strategies of parliamentary groups are strongly related to the level of 
institutional friction associated to different initiatives. A correlation analysis among the number of seats and the 
different initiatives introduced by parliamentary groups illustrate, as expected, a positive correlation between the 
number of seats and the introduction of amendments with alternative text. As figure 3 illustrates, small groups in 
terms of seats, like regional parties (CC (Coalición Canaria), CIU (Convergència i Unió), PNV (Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco) and ERC) and UPyD (Unión Progreso y Democracia), introduce less amendments with 
alternative text proposal than big groups (the PP and the PSOE). The regional party with less parliamentary 
seats, CC, introduces no amendments with alternative text neither during the legislature of Aznar nor in the first 
of Zapatero. The Catalan regional party, CIU, the regional party with more seats, is the one introducing more 
amendments with alternative text proposals, especially during the legislature of Aznar. The regional Basque 
party, the PNV, introduces only two amendments with alternative text across the four legislatures analyzed, 
during the government of Aznar. This is explained because this is a small group but also because its interests 
depend less on the central government compared to other regional parties, like CIU. The Basque Country has its 
own tax system so that it high fiscal autonomy. This means that, contrary to Catalonia and other regional 
governments, it has the capacity of administering the resources of its own territory according to its policy 
preferences. 
In the case of UPyD, this group introduces a relatively high percentage of return amendments during the 
legislature of Rajoy, a parliamentary initiative associated with very low friction, but none of these amendments 
are accompanied with alternative text proposals. This can be explained because this is a small parliamentary 
group, with only five seats, but also because of its lack of parliamentary experience. UPyD is a party created in 
2007 that entered the parliamentary arena for the first time in 2011. More seats mean more resources but also 
parliamentary experience matter. Those groups with more legislatures behind them accumulate knowledge on 
parliamentary affairs and procedures, and are more likely to have alternative text proposals to contest executive’s 







The main exceptions to the rule that small parties introduce fewer amendments with alternative text proposals 
than big groups are small left parties: IU-ERC and Izquierda Plural, which introduce more number of 
amendments with alternative text than other groups with higher number of seats. For example, during the 
legislature of Rajoy, Izquierda Plural introduces more amendments with alternative text than the PSOE, the 
main opposition party. ERC and IU are intermediate cases. These groups introduce fewer amendments with 
alternative text than the PP and the PSOE but more than other parties, like CIU, with more number of seats. 
These differences can be explained by a mix of institutional and contextual factors. First, the low percentage of 
amendments with alternative text introduced by ERC and IU can be explained because these groups gave support 
to the first government of Zapatero. The lack of absolute majority of the incumbent and the requirement of trade- 
offs during the minority socialists government reduce the incentives of introducing return amendments and to 
accompany these with alternative texts proposals. 
Second, Izquierda Plural and ERC-IU do not support the incumbent but they are formed by different political 
parties that joined their seats to have their own parliamentary group. ERC, the Catalan left republican party and 
the far left (IU) formed parliamentary group during the second legislature of Zapatero. Izquierda Plural is a 
coalition of parties that went together to the 2011 general elections and that later formed their own parliamentary 
group in the Chamber, including IU (and its Catalan branch, ICV-EUiA) and CHA (Chunta Aragonesista). 
Finally, these parliamentary groups govern in a context characterized by high confrontation and polarization, 
because of the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008 and the controversial policy measures adopted to 
overcome it. These policies were especially at odds with the preferences of left parties because of the right- 
liberal orientation of the measures implemented following recommendations by the IMF and EU institutions. 
Both Izquierda Plural and ERC-IU devote and important part of its amendments to introduce alternative 
proposals to the regulation of commerce and banking, economic and labour market issues (almost 60% of the 
total in the case of Izquierda Plural, and 66% in the case of ERC-IU). Left parties introduce also more return 
amendments during the last legislature of Zapatero and the legislature of Rajoy, than any other parliamentary 
group. 
On the contrary, the opposition of the conservative party (PP) during the last legislature of Zapatero, following 
the outbreak of the crisis, was not as fierce as the one exercised by left parties. This can be explained by 
ideological congruence with some of the policies implemented by the socialists in line with EU 
recommendations, but also because of the high probabilities of this party to enter office in the 2011 elections. As 
Norton (2008) argues, those parties that are more likely to enter office exercise a more responsible form of 
opposition than outliers. This explains why the PP only introduced 32% of the total return amendments 
introduced during the second legislature of Zapatero, and 40% of the total amendments with alternative text 
proposal, 10% less than in the first legislature of the socialists. 
The PP strategy is also illustrated by its voting activity. The mean percentage of PP abstentions increased from 
8% during Zapatero’s first legislature to 30% in his second term in office. The PP gave support to some of the 
measures introduced by the PSOE to tackle the crisis, for example legislation designed to facilitate credit access 
for businesses and families, but in other important areas of policy making, such as the labour market reform of 







As Palau, Muñoz and Chaqués (2015) argue, this is partly explained because the conservatives did not want to 
give support to the measures passed by the socialists but neither did they want to appear to be in disagreement 
with EU institutions, given that the majority of these policies were introduced in line with EU recommendations 
and it was meant to be the next party in office. 
According to our expectations, the agenda capacity of groups do not only affect the type of parliamentary 
initiative used to oppose executive’s policies, but also the type of issues on which these initiatives are 
introduced. Results illustrates that, as expected, small parliamentary groups concentrate their initiatives on a few 
issues and especially on those initiatives associated with high levels of institutional friction. Figure 4 reports 
entropy scores for return amendments and amendments with alternative text proposals for all parliamentary 
groups. We observe that fragmentation is high in the case of return amendments, but the agenda is very 
concentrated in the case of amendments with alternative text proposals, especially in the case of small 
parliamentary groups. The PP and the PSOE, and also IU, mobilize on the basis of more issues regardless of the 
friction associated with parliamentary initiatives. 
For the interpretation of results, it is important to take into consideration that parliamentary groups can only  
react to the initiatives introduced by the executive, so that they assert their policy preferences in the context of 
those issues already introduced into the agenda by the incumbent. Among the issues prioritized by the executive, 
parliamentary groups have to invest their limited resources to those they consider to be a priority. Left parties 
(Izquierda Plural) focus an important part of their opposition initiatives during the last legislature on issues 
related to the economy, labour and commerce and banking, mainly because 40% of the total bills introduced by 
the government of Rajoy are oriented to overcome the economic crisis. Nonetheless, other parties like regional 
parties, decide not to present any amendment with alternative text proposal on these topics. Similarly, Izquierda 
Plural introduces 30% of their amendments with alternative text proposal on bills related to environmental 
issues, while other groups totally ignore this regulation. Similarly, IU introduces bills with alternative text 
proposals in relation to rights issues, during the legislature of Aznar, and more specifically on immigration, 
responding to the bill introduced by the conservative in order to make immigration policy more restrictive. 
Regional parties also concentrate its agenda according to their preferences, and more specifically to those related 
to the interests of their constituencies. The Basque party, the PNV, is among the groups with a more 
concentrated agenda. It rarely reacts to executives’ initiatives with the introduction of amendments with 
alternative text proposals and when it does so, it focuses on very few topics. This group only introduces two 
amendments with alternative text during the period under analysis. One is related to the initiative of the Aznar 
government to regulate professional training giving priority to the private sector and clearly encroaching upon 
regional competences. The bill introduced by the PNV however, is exactly the same that the one introduced by 
CIU on the same bill. This illustrates that small/regional groups may join resources in their opposition activities 
in order to defend their interests if they share preferences on a specific topic. The other amendment with 
alternative text proposal introduced by the PNV is related to the Criminal Procedure Act introduced by Aznar 
oriented, among other things, to enlarge confinement and policy custody of detainees (with more restrictive 







On the contrary, the agenda of CIU is much more fragmented, because it is a bigger parliamentary group but also 
because its policy preferences are more fragmented compared to the Basques. All decisions taken by the central 
government, have much more impact on Catalan interests than those of the Basques, mainly because, as 
explained, Catalonia has not its own fiscal system. CIU introduces more amendments with alternative text 
proposals and on more issues, including commerce (regulation of trading hours), transports (especially the 
regulation of the rail sector and ports) and water (the hydrological national plan), issues that directly affected the 
interests of Catalan regional parties, contrary to the Basques. Overall, this illustrates that regional groups 
mobilize and invest their resources on those topics that affect the interests of their constituencies. 
 
 
VI. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
 
 
To test to what extent parliamentary behavior respond to institutional factors we have run different regression 
models. First we consider aggregated data, with one model testing whether variations in the type of government, 
the economic situation, distance from elections and the EU content of legislation explain changes in party 
behavior (negative vote for legislation, return amendments and amendments with alternative text proposals). 
Table 4 presents the regression results for the aggregated model. The results illustrate that negative vote for 
legislation increases during absolute majorities and also when the economic situation is bad (model 1). The 
analysis of return amendments illustrates also that this type of opposition increases when the incumbent is 
governing with the absolute majority of seats (in both ordinary and organic bills) but this variable is not affected 
by variations in the economic situation. When the economic situation is bad, there are not more return 
amendments on legislation. The analysis of return amendments with alternative text proposal shows that this 
form of opposition is also more common during absolute majority governments (in all types of bills) but it is not 
affected by the economic situation. The number of organic bills with alternative text proposal decreases during 
the Rajoy government, and it is relatively low compared to those introduced during the Aznar’s. From 2000 to 
2004 more return amendments were introduced on organic laws but, proportionally, these were more 
accompanied by alternative text proposals than those introduced during Rajoy’s legislature. This can be 
explained because, proportionally, during this term there were more organic bills that had the support of all 
parliamentary groups, like the one about the King’s abdication, but not even highly controversial reforms, like 
the education bill introduced by Minister of Education, Ignacio Wert, was accompanied by alternative text 
proposal on the part of any group. This bill received eleven return amendments but none of them with alternative 
text. This may reflect the increasing confrontation and polarization of Spanish politics and the evolution towards 
an opposition style characterized by a less cooperative and constructive type of opposition. 
The hypothesis that parliamentary groups show higher opposition to the executives’ initiatives at the end of the 
term when elections are coming, is not corroborated by our results. The variable distance from elections is only 
statistically significant in the case of voting, illustrating that conflict is higher at the beginning of the legislature 
than at the end of the term. This can be explained because the incumbent probably introduces the most 







reforms at the end of the term. In the input side, results corroborate that parliamentary groups do not introduce 
more return amendments neither more amendments with alternative text proposal when elections approach. 
Therefore, we cannot say that return amendments are used as symbolic tools, considering electoral strategies. 
With regards to the EU, results illustrate that, as expected, the relation between return amendments and the EU 
content of legislation is negative (although not statistically significant) but country to our expectations, those 
bills with EU content have more amendments with alternative text proposal than purely domestic bills. Further 
research is required to explain this pattern, but it may be related to the measures adopted during the economic 
crisis implemented following EU recommendations. An analysis of the differences across issues illustrates that 
most of these amendments are related to economic, labor or commerce and banking. During the legislature of 
Aznar, the amendments with alternative text proposal introduced on EU bills on these topics represented 6% of 
the total. During the last legislature of Zapatero, when the socialists had already passed important reforms, 
especially since 2010, these represented 75% of the total, and during the Rajoy’s legislature 50%. Regression 
results differentiated by parliamentary group, illustrate that the variable EU is only positive and statistically 
significant in the case of the far left (IU). This is consistent with the results of previous research, which have 
already demonstrated that the economic crisis has increased the incentives of left parties to oppose to EU related 





This paper has analyzed party behavior in the parliamentary arena considering both, the input and the output 
sphere, in order to explain variations in the patters of consensus and the opposition strategies of parliamentary 
groups. Results illustrate that institutional factors matter. Variations in agenda capacity explain why groups with 
small number of seats, and especially those without previous parliamentary experience, focus their opposition 
strategies on initiatives associated with low institutional friction, like return amendments. On the contrary, big 
groups, or small groups composed of two different parties, have more resources and can introduce initiatives 
associates with more friction, like amendments with alternative text proposals. Institutional factors are important 
to explain why parties choose different opposition strategies but also patterns of parliamentary consensus. The 
opposition of parliamentary groups to the initiatives introduced by the executive is always higher during absolute 
majority governments, regardless of the parliamentary initiative considered. Other contextual factors, like 
variations in the electoral cycle, are not related to variations in the patterns of parliamentary consensus neither on 














Opposition initiative Sphere Strategy based on Institutional 
 
Friction 
Negative voting (decree law and 
organic laws) 
Output Opposing executive’s initiatives Low 
Return amendments Input Opposing executive’s initiatives Low 



















Return With Negative 
Legislature Group 
Seats (and 
Amendments Alternative Vote 
   (%) Text (%) (Mean %) 
 PSOE 125(9) 37 41 25 
 
PP 183(9) 
   
 
IU 8(5) 40 27 23 
Aznar CIU 15(9) 9 23 9 
 
PNV 7(9) 14 9 11 
 
CC 4(4) 
   
 Total  100 100 - 
 PSOE 164    
 
PP 148 41 50 24 
 
IU 5 13 29 6 
 
CIU 10 20 7 5 













ERC 8(1) 18 14 5 
 Total  100 100 - 
 PSOE 169    
 
PP 154 32 40 12 
 
CIU 10 7 
 
1.4 




   
17 
 
ERC-IU 5(1) 61 60 30 

















Izquierda Plural 11(1) 33 50 57 
CIU 16 16 7 25 
PNV 5 11 
 
26 
UPyD 5(1) 15 
 
43 
Total  100 100 - 
 
 
*Experience, in brackets, shows the number of legislatures that the party has parliamentary representation and its 
own parliamentary group in the Chamber from 1982 to present. ERC-IU and Izquierda Plural are parliamentary 
groups composed of different parties that joined their seats during the second legislatures of Zapatero and the 











 Model 1  Model 2  
Negative Voting B Sig. B Sig. 
Constant 9,840 ,001 15,534 ,000 
Seats ,131 ,000 -,045 ,597 
Economy ,038 ,214 -,092 ,157 
Distance Elections -,008 ,001 -,006 ,023 





Return Amendments     
Constant -,010 ,976 ,355 ,375 
Seats ,029 ,000 ,018 ,029 
Economy ,002 ,435 -,006 ,361 
Distance Elections ,000 ,563 ,000 ,320 





With Atlernative Text     
Constant ,062 ,312 ,065 ,418 
Seats ,002 ,011 ,002 ,313 
Economy -,001 ,073 -,001 ,369 
Distance Elections ,000 ,794 ,000 ,817 







Note: Cells report OLS parameter estimates. The variable seats indicate the seats difference between the 
incumbent and the main opposition party. Economy reports the percentage of citizens considering the economic 
situation is bad or very bad. Distance elections correspond to the number of days that have elapsed from the 
election’s day to the day the piece of legislation is voted/amended. EU is a dummy variable with value 1 if the 










Figure 1. Percentage of executive bills passed using the ordinary procedure and percentage of decree-laws 
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Aznar ZP I ZPII Rajoy 
Return Amendments   Mean Pct Negative Votes 




Note: the figure shows the mean percentage of negative vote for legislation (organic laws and decree laws), and 





































Note: the figure shows on the Y axis the mean number of seats per legislature of each parliamentary group 
(considering the legislatures under analysis), and on the X axis the mean percentage of amendments with 
alternative text proposal introduced by each group. For example, in the case of IU, 28% of return amendments 
corresponds to the percentage of amendments introduced by this group (see table 2) in the second legislature of 
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Amendments to a bill entailing an increase in budgetary appropriations or a reduction in budgetary revenue 
require the Government’s authorization, that has to give a reply within fifteen days. 
ii 
Organic laws require the absolute majority of Congress’ votes to be passed and are limited to the regulation of 
specific issues, i.e., – the exercise of fundamental rights and public liberties, the general electoral system, the 
approval of the regional statutes (Estatutos de Autonomías), and other procedures considered in the Spanish 
Constitution including the regulation of the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) and or 
the states of alert, emergency or siege (section 81 of the Spanish Constitution). 
iii 
Decree-laws are provisional regulatory acts passed by the executive in case of extraordinary or urgent 
necessity, or when exceptional circumstances impede following the ordinary legislative procedures. As defined 
in section 86 of the Spanish Constitution, decree-laws cannot deal with issues related to the regulation of basic 
State institutions, rights, duties, and liberties of citizens, the Estatutos de Autonomía, nor the general electoral 
system, and have a provisional character. Decree-laws have to be submitted for debate and voting by the entire 
Congress within thirty days of their promulgation. The Congress has to adopt a specific decision on their 











Shannon’s H Entropy= - Ʃ p(xi)*logn p(xi) where xi represents a dimension, p(xi) is the proportion of total 
attention the dimension receives logn p(xi) is the log of the proportion of attention the dimension receives, using 
the total number of possible dimensions as the base of the log (Boydstun et al 2014). 
v 
If we consider previous research (Mújica and Sánchez Cuenca 2006) conducted on voting behavior in Spain. 
